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We initiate the study of the capacity constrained facility location problem from a mechanism design per-
spective. e capacity constrained seing leads to a new strategic environment where a facility serves a
subset of the population, which is endogenously determined by the ex-post Nash equilibrium of an induced
subgame and is not directly controlled by the mechanism designer. Our focus is on mechanisms that are
ex-post dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DIC) at the reporting stage. We provide a complete char-
acterization of DIC mechanisms via the family of Generalized Median Mechanisms (GMMs). In general, the
social welfare optimal mechanism is not DIC. Adopting the worst-case approximation measure, we aain
tight lower bounds on the approximation ratio of any DIC mechanism. e well-known median mechanism
is shown to be optimal among the family of DIC mechanisms for certain capacity ranges. Surprisingly, the
framework we introduce provides a new characterization for the family of GMMs, and is responsive to gaps in
the current social choice literature highlighted by Border and Jordan (1983) and Barbara`, Masso´ and Serizawa
(1998).
1 INTRODUCTION
A common economic problem is deciding where a public facility should be located to service a
population of agents with heterogenous preferences. For example, a government needs to decide
the location of a public hospital, or library. More abstractly, the ‘location’ may represent a type
or quality of a service. For example, a government may have a fixed hospital location but must
decide on the type of service the hospital will specialize, and, in particular, whether the service will
be targeted to those suffering from acute, moderate, or mild severity of a certain illness. In such
problems, participants may benefit by misreporting their preferences, and this can be problematic
for a decision maker trying to find a socially optimal solution. is leads to the mechanism design
problem of providing optimal, or approximately optimal, solutions while also being strategyproof,
i.e., no agent can profit from misreporting their preferences regardless of what others report.1 We
call this the facility location problem.
A large literature has studied the facility location problem under the assumption that the facility
does not face capacity constraints. When the facility is not capacity constrained, all agents can
benefit from the facility and hence it is modeled as a public good.2 Under this assumption, themech-
anism design problem is explored in several classic papers [Black, 1948, Border and Jordan, 1983,
Gibbard, 1973, 1977, Moulin, 1980, Saerthwaite, 1975], and more recently in algorithmic mecha-
nism design [Feldman et al., 2016, Nisan and Ronen, 2001, Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013].
*is paper was previously circulated under the title “Mechanism Design without Money for Common Goods.”
Authors’ email addresses: Haris Aziz: haris.aziz@unsw.edu.au; Hau Chan: hchan3@unl.edu, Barton E. Lee:
barton.e.lee@gmail.com, David C. Parkes: parkes@eecs.harvard.edu.
1We focus on the ‘mechanism design without money’ problem where the use of money is assumed to not be permied.
is is a natural assumption for environments where the use of money is considered unlawful (e.g., organ donations) or
unethical (e.g., political decision making, or locating a public good).
2A public good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
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To the best of our knowledge, an unexplored seing for the mechanism design problem is where
the public facility is capacity constrained.3 Capacity constraints limit the number of agents who
can benefit from the facility’s services. Such constraints are ubiquitous in practice: a hospital is
capacity constrained by the number of beds and doctors, and a library may have limited seating.
When present, capacity constraints introduce a particular form of rivalry to the facility, since
once the facility reaches its capacity limit additional agents are prevented from using, and hence
benefiting, from the facility.
A number of new strategic challenges arise for the mechanism designer when the public facil-
ity is capacity constrained but is still non-excludable. For example, when the mechanism designer
chooses a location for the facility, we cannot stipulate which agents will be served, instead these de-
cisions are made by participants, through strategic interactions once the facility has been located.
at is, the ex-post Nash equilibrium of a subgame induced by the facility location determines the
agents who ultimately benefit from the facility and those who do not. is introduces a technical
challenge, because it leads agents to have interdependent utilities, since the utility for a particular
location depends on who else will use the location (and in turn on their preferences). Further-
more, the reporting game is made in anticipation of the extensive-form game and ex-post Nash
equilibrium, and the designer must consider mechanisms that are strategyproof in this broader
game-theoretic context.
In this paper, we initiate the study of the capacity constrained facility location problem from the
viewpoint of mechanism design. In our model, n agents are located in the [0, 1] interval, and there
is a single facility to be located, this facility is able to service at most k agents, where k is some
positive integer. When k ≥ n the capacity constraint is of no effect, and the capacity constrained
facility location problem is equivalent to the classic problem. Agent locations are privately known,
and, given a facility location, the ex-post Nash equilibrium of an induced subgame determines
which agents are served. e mechanism designer’s problem is to design mechanisms that are
strategyproof and maximize social welfare. In our model, we take strategyproof to mean ex-post
dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DIC) at the reporting stage. at is, conditional on the
ex-post Nash equilibrium being aained in the induced subgame, an agent never benefits ex-post
from misreporting their location to the mechanism regardless of what other agents report, and
regardless of other agents’ true locations. For ease of exposition, a mechanism that is DIC at the
reporting stage will simply be said to be DIC. Unlike the classic facility location problemwhere the
facility is not capacity constrained, the social welfare optimal mechanism is not DIC except when
the capacity constraint is trivial, i.e., k = 1 orn. As a result, we follow the approach of Procaccia and
Tennenholtz [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013] and consider the approximate mechanism design
problem. We adopt the worst-case approximation measure for social welfare, and ask what is the
best approximation achievable with a DIC mechanisms and how does this vary as a function of
the capacity constraint?
e literature studying the facility location problem without capacity constraints, or simply k =
n, provides a number of important results. Gibbard-Saerthwaite [Gibbard, 1973, Saerthwaite,
1975] showed a powerful impossibility result: when agents can have unrestricted preferences there
need not exist any strategyproof mechanism. As a result, more recent works typically restrict
agent preferences’ over the location of the facility to be single-peaked and sometimes in addition
3ere is a distinct seing sometimes referred to as the ‘constrained facility location’ problems [Sui and Boutilier, 2015]
where the feasible locations for the facility are constrained. e algorithmic problem, of locating multiple capacity con-
strained facilities when agents are not strategic, has also been studied [Brandeau and Chiu, 1989, Pa´l et al., 2001, Vygen,
2004].
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symmetric.4 We focus on the case where, conditional on the agent being served, the agent has
preferences that are both single-peaked and symmetric. When the objective of the mechanism
designer is to maximize social welfare, i.e., utilitarian welfare, the standard median mechanism is
both strategyproof and social welfare optimal [Black, 1948]. More generally, a goal of the social
choice literature has been to characterize the complete family of strategyproof mechanisms. Clos-
est to our seing, Border and Jordan [Border and Jordan, 1983] provide a partial characterization
of strategyproof mechanisms via the family of Generalized Median Mechanisms (GMMs). Border
and Jordan show that a mechanism is strategyproof and unanimity respecting5 if and only if it is
a GMM, and that the family of GMMs is strictly smaller than the complete family of strategyproof
mechanisms.6 is has le a gap in the literature to characterize the complete family of strate-
gyproof mechanisms and understand the difference in strategyproof mechanisms that are GMMs
and those that are not. Figure 2 schematically illustrates this gap.
OurContributions:We introduce a newmechanism problem, the capacity constrained facility
location problem. is problem is a natural variant of the classic facility problemwhere the facility
is assumed to face capacity constraints. A conceptual contribution is to formalize the effect of
capacity constraints when the facility is non-excludable but cannot service all agents. We do this
by defining an extensive-form game involving the mechanism designer and agents. First, agents
report their preferences to the designer, and then the facility is located by themechanism. Once the
facility is located a subgame is inducedwhere agents strategically choosewhether or not to aempt
to be served by the facility. e ex-post Nash equilibrium determines which agents are served by
the facility and which are not. We seek mechanisms that are strategyproof in this broader game-
theoretic context, i.e., ex-post dominant-strategy incentive compatible; that is, conditional on the
ex-post Nash equilibrium being achieved in the subgame, no agent can benefit from misreporting
their location regardless of what other agents report and regardless of other agents’ true locations.
Our main theoretical contribution is a complete characterization of DIC mechanisms for the
capacity constrained facility location problem. We show that a mechanism is DIC if and only
if it belongs to the established family of mechanisms called the Generalized Median Mechanisms
(GMMs), which appear in Moulin [Moulin, 1980] and Border and Jordan [Border and Jordan, 1983].
us, the framework we introduce surprisingly provides a new characterization of GMMs. is
result contributes to a novel perspective to a “major open question” (Barbara`, Masso´ and Ser-
izawa [Barbara` et al., 1998]) posed in Border and Jordan [Border and Jordan, 1983] (further discus-
sion is provided in Section 2).
We also provide algorithmic results and study the performance of DIC mechanisms in optimiz-
ing social welfare. We adopt the worst-case approximation measure, and provide a lower bound on
the approximation ratio of any DIC mechanism. We show that at best the approximation ratio of a
DICmechanism is 2 k
k+1 when k ≤ ⌈(n−1)/2⌉, and max{
n−1
k+1 , 1} otherwise. Interestingly, this lower
bound is achieved by the standard median mechanism (which is also DIC) when k ≤ ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉
or k = n, and hence the median mechanism is optimal among all DIC mechanisms in those ranges.
Figure 1 illustrates these approximation results.
4A single-peaked preference is symmetric if equidistant locations on either side of the ideal, or ‘peak’, location are always
equally preferred.
5Unanimity respecting simply means that if there is a unanimously most preferred facility location then the mechanism
must locate the facility at this location.
6We note that in a slightly different seing, where the single-peaked preferences are possibly asymmetric, GMMs pro-
vide a complete characterization of strategyproof and ‘peak only’ mechanisms (Proposition 3 of Moulin [Moulin, 1980]).
Example 3.3 in the present paper provides an example of a mechanism that is strategyproof in the Border and Jor-
dan [Border and Jordan, 1983] seing but not the Moulin [Moulin, 1980] seing.
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Finally, we consider an extension of our framework where the mechanism designer can also
restrict access to the facility, and hence dictate which agents are served. is extension is relevant
to seings where the designer can issue permits, and prevent certain agents from accessing the
facility. Under an anonymity assumption, we show that nomechanism that both locates the facility
and stipulates which agents can be served is DIC.
1 n/4 n/2 3n/4 n
1
2
3
k
α-approximation
DIC lower bound
median mech. upper bound
Fig. 1. Worst-case approximation ratio as a function of the capacity constraint, k .
Outline: Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 presents our model and formal-
izes the objective of the mechanism designer, Section 3.1 then presents our key characterization
result of DIC mechanisms. Section 4 explores the performance, i.e., approximation results, of DIC
mechanisms. Section 5 considers an extension of our framework where the mechanism designer
is able to dictate which agents are served by the facility. Lastly, we conclude with a discussion in
Section 6.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
A number of papers have considered related mechanism problems where the use of money is not
permied [Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003, Ashlagi and Roth, 2011, Border and Jordan, 1983,
Gibbard, 1973, Mei et al., 2016, Moulin, 1980, Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013, Saerthwaite, 1975,
Sui and Boutilier, 2015]. Most closely related to our paper is [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013],
where agents with single-peaked preferences are located along the real line and the problem of
locating a (non-capacity constrained) public facility is studied with the goal of minimizing two
distinct objective functions; the total social cost and the maximum social cost. is problem is
oen referred to as a single facility location problem, or single facility location game.7 In this pa-
per, we focus on minimizing the first objective function in the new environment where the facility
7We do not review a large segment of computer science and operations research literature on facility location problems
that assumes complete information and hence does not require a mechanism design approach to overcome strategic ten-
sions (for a survey see [Brandeau and Chiu, 1989]). Furthermore, this literature, when incorporating capacity constraints,
typically focuses on the problem of locating multiple capacity constrained facilities that have sufficient capacity to service
all agents [Charikar et al., 2002, Cygan et al., 2012, Pa´l et al., 2001, Vygen, 2004]. Instead we review the subset of literature
that assumes strategic agents and takes a mechanism design approach.
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is capacity constrained. In contrast to the seing studied by [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013],
agents have interdependent utilities, in our model, due to the capacity constraints of the facility
and the induced subgame. Accordingly, the mechanism design problem requires consideration of
a broader game-theoretic environment where agents face an extensive-form gamewhen reporting
preferences.
Another large body of literature has been concerned with characterizing DIC mechanisms for
the unconstrained facility location problem. e key pioneeringworks in this area are byMoulin [Moulin,
1980], and Border and Jordan [Border and Jordan, 1983]. In one-dimensional space and for symmet-
ric and single-peaked preferences, Border and Jordan [Border and Jordan, 1983] characterize a gen-
eral class of DIC mechanisms which have become to be known as generalized median mechanisms
(GMM), and in addition show that when the property of unanimity is enforced every DIC mecha-
nism is a GMM.8 ese results differ slightly from the characterization results of Moulin [Moulin,
1980] since the seing studied in [Moulin, 1980] does not restrict the single-peaked preferences
to be symmetric. Characterizing DIC but non-unanimity respecting mechanisms was posed as
an open problem; as stated by Border and Jordan in [Border and Jordan, 1983] “[the characteri-
zation] leaves several open problems. e most obvious question is: what happens if the unanim-
ity assumption is dropped?” Characterizations however, have remained elusive and it has become
known as a “major open question” [Barbara` et al., 1998] with only partial progress towards a reso-
lution [Barbara` et al., 1998, Ching, 1997, Peremans et al., 1997, Weymark, 2011]. In this paper we
focus on the one-dimensional case where open questions still remain; in particular, the results
of [Border and Jordan, 1983] in one-dimensional space leaves two gaps:
(1) there exist non-unanimity respecting DIC mechanisms that are not GMM, and
(2) there exist DIC mechanisms that are GMMs but do not respect unanimity.
Our characterization of DIC mechanisms via the family of GMM, although considered in a differ-
ent seing where the facility is capacity constrained, applies more generally to mechanisms that
are not unanimity respecting. Hence, we contribute a novel perspective to these gaps in charac-
terization, showing that a mechanism is DIC for all possible capacity constraint k ≤ n if and only
if it is a GMM. is means that any mechanism in gap (1) is not DIC when the facility is capacity
constrained with k < n. Furthermore, the unanimity property is sufficient to ensure that a mech-
anism that is DIC in the non-capacity constrained seing remains DIC when capacity constraints
are present.
3 MODEL, BASIC PROPERTIES, AND DEFINITIONS
Model: Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a finite set of n agents and let X = [0, 1] be the domain of agent
locations. Each agent i ∈ N has a location xi ∈ X , which is privately known, the profile of agent
locations is denoted by x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). e profile of all agent except some agent i ∈ N is
denoted by x−i = (x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). ere is a single facility to be located in X by
some mechanism. A mechanism is a function M :
∏
i ∈N X → X mapping a profile of locations to
a single location.9 We denote the mechanism’s output, or facility location, by s ∈ X .
e facility faces a capacity constraint k : k ≤ n, which provides a limit on the number of
agents that can be served. A served agent aains utility ui = 1−d(s, xi ) ≥ 0, where d(·, ·) denotes
the Euclidean metric; an unserved agent aains zero utility, ui = 0.
10 e set of agents served
8Border and Jordan [Border and Jordan, 1983] also consider the problem in higher dimensions.
9We restrict our aention to deterministic mechanisms.
10Our characterization results (Section 3.1) do not rely on this specific utility function – we only require that agents weakly
prefer to be served than not, and conditional on being served the agent’s utility is symmetric and (strictly) single-peaked.
However, our approximation results do rely on the choice of utility function.
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by the facility’s limited capacity is not directly controlled by the mechanism, since the facility
is assumed to be non-excludable.11 Instead, this is determined by the equilibrium outcome of a
subgame induced by the mechanism’s choice of facility location.
Given an instance 〈x , s,k〉, we assume that the set of agents served by the facility is determined
via the ex-post Nash equilibrium12 of a subgame, Γx (s,k). e subgame Γx (s,k) is as follows. Each
agent i ∈ N chooses an action ai ∈ A = {∅, s} of whether, or not, to travel from their location
xi to the facility location s . Action ai = s denotes agent i’s choice to travel to the facility, and
action ai = ∅ denotes the agent’s choice to not travel to the facility. We denote the profile of
agent actions by a = (a1, a2, . . . ,an). An agent i is served by the facility if they travel to the
facility, ai = s , and strictly less than k other agents travel to the facility, i.e., |N (a, s)| ≤ k where
N (a, s) := {i ∈ N : ai = s}. If instead they travel to the facility and at least k other agents
also travel to the facility, i.e., |N (a, s)| > k , then a tie-breaking rule is used to determine which
subset of k agents in N (a, s) are served. We assume a distance-based tie-breaking rule (⊲) whereby
agent i has higher priority than agent j , denoted i ⊲ j , if agent i is closer to the facility than agent
j , i.e., d(s, xi ) < d(s, x j ); if agent i and j are equidistant, i.e., d(s, xi ) = d(s, x j ), then we apply
some deterministic tie-breaking rule.13 is distance-based tie-breaking rule can be motivated by
a ‘first-come-first-serve’ protocol when the location s is geographical and agents physically travel
to the facility to be served. If the location s corresponds to a type, or quality, of service the ‘first-
come-first-serve’ protocol is analogous to a ‘best-fit’ tie-breaking protocol that prioritizes agents
according to how close the type of service being offered is to their true needs, i.e., d(s, xi ). An
agent i with location xi aains utility 1 − d(s, xi ) if ai = s and they are served, if ai = s and they
are not served they aain utility −d(s, xi ), and otherwise ai = ∅ and agent i aains zero utility.
Abusing terminology slightly, given a profile of locations x and facility location s , we will refer
to k highest priority agents with respect to the distance-based tie-breaking rule (⊲) as the k-closest
agents. We denote this set of agents by N ∗
k
(x, s).
Basic properties of the model: For any instance 〈x , s,k〉, the subgame Γx (s,k) has an (essen-
tially) unique equilibrium. ere always exists an equilibrium where the k-closest agents, N ∗
k
(x, s),
choose to travel to the facility and are served by the facility. In instances where one or more of the
k-closest agents are indifferent between being served and not traveling to the facility, i.e., when-
ever d(s, xi ) = 1 for some i ∈ N
∗
k
(x, s), multiple equilibria arise. For the purposes of this paper
these equilibria are all ‘equivalent’ since every agent aains the same utility in each of the equilib-
ria. Proposition 3.1 states this basic property. e proof is straightforward and le to the appendix
for the interested reader.
Proposition 3.1. For any instance 〈x , s,k〉, there exists an equilibrium of the subgame Γx (s,k)
and, furthermore, in every equilibrium agent i ∈ N aains utility 1 − d(s, xi ) if i ∈ N
∗
k
(x, s), and
otherwise, aains zero utility.
Given Proposition 3.1, we can denote agent i’s ex-post equilibrium utility from the facility loca-
tion s by simply u∗i (s,x,k). A useful observation is that the agent’s ex-post utilities are (weakly)
single-peaked, this result is stated in Proposition 3.2. e proof is straightforward and le to the
appendix for the interested reader. Intuitively, the result holds because under the distance-based
priority (⊲) an agent’s priority only (weakly) improves when the facility moves from a location
s < xi to a new location s
′ : s < s ′ ≤ xi (similarly for s > xi ).
11In Section 5 we weaken this assumption and consider the problem when the facility can be made excludable.
12at is, no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate, whatever the preferences of each agent.
13is ensure that the binary relation ⊲ is complete.
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Proposition 3.2. For any agent i ∈ N and any pair of instances 〈x , s,k〉 and 〈x , s ′,k〉, if s < s ′ ≤
xi or xi ≤ s
′ < s then u∗i (s,x,k) ≤ u
∗
i (s
′,x,k).
In this paper we are interested in ‘strategyproof’ mechanisms where agents do not have an
incentive to misreport their location. In particular, we use the ex-post Dominant-strategy Incentive
Compatible (DIC) concept of strategyproofness. at is, a mechanismM is DIC if for every agent
i ∈ N
u∗i
(
M(xi , xˆ−i ),x,k
)
≥ u∗i
(
M(x ′i , xˆ−i ),x,k
)
for every x ′i , for every xˆ−i , and for every x−i . Note that DIC implies that, conditional on the ex-post
Nash equilibrium being achieved in the subgame Γx (s,k), the mechanism is dominant-strategy in-
centive compatible at the reporting stage. Formally speaking, the DIC definition depends on the
capacity constraint k however, abusing notation slightly, we omit the k dependence as this will be
clear from the context.
Objective of the mechanism designer: In this paper we are interested in DIC mechanisms
that perform well with respect to social welfare, i.e., the sum of agents’ equilibrium utilities. As is
now standard in the algorithmic mechanism design literature we measure the performance of a
DIC mechanism by the worst-case approximation ratio.
Given an instance 〈x , s,k〉, denote the optimal social welfare byΠ∗(x,k) := maxs ∈X
∑n
i=1u
∗
i (s,x,k),
and given a mechanismM let ΠM (x,k) denote the social welfare aained by the mechanism, i.e.,
ΠM (x,k) :=
n∑
i=1
u∗i (s,x,k) where s = M(x).
e mechanismM is an α-approximation if
max
x ∈
∏
n
i=1 X
{
Π
∗(x,k)
ΠM (x,k)
}
≤ α , (1)
the LHS of (1) is referred to as the approximation ratio. A mechanism (or family of mechanisms) is
said to have a lower bound, α¯ , on the approximation ratio if
α¯ ≤ max
x ∈
∏
n
i=1 X
{
Π
∗(x,k)
ΠM (x,k)
}
. (2)
We refer to a mechanism M that aains the optimal social welfare for all instances 〈x, s,k〉, and
hence is an α = 1-approximation, as an optimal mechanism. Again, the optimal mechanism defi-
nition depends on the capacity constraint k however, abusing notation, we will omit the k depen-
dence as this will be clear from the context. Note that the optimal mechanism need not, and in
general will not, be DIC for a given k .
Remark 1. When k = n our model reduces to the well-known facility location problem studied
in [Black, 1948, Moulin, 1980, Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013]. Accordingly, this case (k = n) is fully
resolved: the ‘median’ mechanism which always locates the facility at the median reported location
is both optimal and DIC. However, the case for k < n has not been studied before – this is the focus of
the present paper.
To illustrate how the case where k < n differs from the standard k = n seing we provide
an example. e example considers a mechanism that is DIC when k = n but for any capacity
constraint k < n is not DIC.
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Example 3.3. Let M be the mechanism such that M(x) = argmins ∈{1/4, 3/4} d(s, xi ) for some
i ∈ N , tie-breaking in favor of s = 1/4 if necessary. at is, the mechanism locates the facility at
either location 1/4 or 3/4 depending on which is closest to agent i’s report.
First, notice that the mechanism M is DIC when k = n. If k = n then every agent i is always
served by the facility and hence aains utility 1−d(s, xi) for any facility location s . It is immediate
that agent i can never strictly benefit from misreporting their location.
However, when k < n the mechanism is not DIC. To see this, consider an instance where agent i
is located at 3/8 and all other agents are located at 1/4. When agent i truthfully reports, the facility
is located at 1/4 and is not served – leading to zero utility. On the other hand, misreporting to
x ′i ∈ (1/2, 1] leads to the facility location 3/4 and agent i is the closest agent to the facility. In this
case agent i aains strictly higher utility equal to 1 − d(3/4, 3/8) > 0. us, the mechanism is not
DIC for any k < n. ⋄
3.1 A complete characterization of DIC mechanisms
We begin by defining a family of mechanisms called Generalized Median Mechanisms (GMM). is
family was introduced by Border and Jordan [Border and Jordan, 1983] for the k = n seing, and
provides a partial characterization of DICmechanisms. emain result of the present paper shows
that GMMs provide a complete characterization of mechanisms that are (1) DIC for all k ≤ n, and
(2) DIC for some k < n.
Definition 3.4. [Generalized Median Mechanism (GMM)] A mechanismM is said to be a Gener-
alized Median Mechanism (GMM) if for each S ⊆ N there are constants aS , such that for all location
profiles x
M(x) = min
S⊆N
max
{
max
i ∈S
{xi },aS
}
. (3)
To build some intuition, we highlight some well-known GMM mechanisms:
(1) e median mechanism14 is aained from (3) by seing aS = 1 for all subsets S ⊆ N with
|S | < ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ and aS = 0 otherwise.
(2) e s-constant mechanism15 for some location s ∈ X , i.e., the mechanism that always
outputs location s , is aained from (3) by seing a∅ = s and aS = 1 for all other (non-
empty) subsets S ⊆ N .
(3) e agent i dictatorship mechanism16 is aained from (3) by seing aS = 0 for S = {i} and
aS = 1 for other subsets S ⊆ N .
An example of a mechanism that is not a GMM is the dictatorial-style mechanism considered in
Example 3.3.
e main result of the present paper is the following characterization: A mechanism M is DIC
for some k < n if and only if M is DIC for every k ≤ n if and only if M is a GMM. is result is
stated in eorem 3.5.
Theorem 3.5. Let M be a mechanism. e following are equivalent:
(1) M is a GMM,
(2) M is DIC for some k < n,
(3) M is DIC for every k ≤ n.
14A mechanism that always outputs the median of the reported location profile i.e., the ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋-th smallest report.
15A mechanism that always outputs the location s .
16A mechanism that always outputs the location of agent i ’s report.
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We present the proof via a series of propositions, and utilize a characterization of Border and
Jordan Border and Jordan [1983]. Before presenting these propositions we illustrate the contribu-
tion of eorem 3.5, benchmarked against the results of Border and Jordan [1983]: where GMM
are shown to be a strict subset of DIC mechanisms when k = n. Below, in Figure 2, we present the
result of Border and Jordan [1983]. Figure 3 illustrates our contribution. When considering the
capacity constrained problem, with k < n, the family of DIC mechanisms coincides precisely with
the GMM family.
DIC
GMM
Fig. 2. Seing where k = n [Border and Jordan, 1983].
DIC ≡ GMM
Fig. 3. Seing where k < n.
First, we present a result of Border and Jordan [1983] characterizing the family of GMMs via a
property of the mechanism that they call ‘uncompromising’. Informally speaking, an uncompro-
mising mechanisms means that an agent cannot influence the mechanism output in their favor by
reporting extreme locations. e most obvious mechanism satisfying this property is the median
mechanism. Formally, a mechanismM is said to be uncompromising if for every profile of locations
x , and each agent i ∈ N , if M(x) = s then
xi > s =⇒ M(x
′
i ,x−i ) = s for all x
′
i ≥ s and, (4)
xi < s =⇒ M(x
′
i ,x−i ) = s for all x
′
i ≤ s . (5)
Lemma 3.6 (Border and Jordan [Border and Jordan, 1983]). A mechanism M is uncompro-
mising if and only if it is a GMM.
Note that Lemma 3.6, although proved in the seing where k = n, does not rely on any strategic
properties of the mechanism and so applies more generally to our seing of interest where k ≤ n.
We now prove our first proposition towards the characterization result. Proposition 3.7 says
that, every GMM is DIC for any k ≤ n.
Proposition 3.7. Every GMM is DIC for any k ≤ n.
Proof. Fix k ≤ n and letM be a GMM. For the sake of a contradiction suppose thatM not DIC.
at is, for some agent i with location xi , there exist a profile of other agent locations x−i , and
reports xˆ−i such that for some x
′
i , xi
u∗i (M(x
′
i , xˆ−i ),x,k) > u
∗
i (M(xi , xˆ−i ),x,k). (6)
Define s ′ = M(x ′i , xˆ−i ) and s = M(xi , xˆ−i ). It is immediate from (6) that s , xi and s , s
′. Without
loss of generality we assume that xi > s . By assumption, M is a GMM and hence by Lemma 3.6
satisfies the uncompromising property. It follows that x ′i < s , since otherwise x
′
i ≥ s and (4) would
imply s ′ = s contradicting (6).
Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, and David C. Parkes 10
Case 1: Suppose s < s ′. en x ′i < s
′ and the uncompromising property (5) implies that
M(x ′′i ,x−i ) = s
′ for all x ′′i ≤ s
′
.
If x ′′i ∈ [s, s
′] the uncompromising property implies that M(x ′′i ,x−i ) = M(xi ,x−i ), i.e., s
′
= s ,
which contradicts (6). us, we conclude that x ′′i < s .
Now consider a new instance where agent i has true location yi = ε ∈ (0, s), all other agents
have true location yj = 0 but collectively report xˆ−i . If agent i reports yi = ε then the facility
location is s ′ and i aains utility 1 − d(s ′, ε). If instead agent i reports y′i = xi then the facility
location is s < s ′ and i aains strictly higher utility 1 − d(s, ε). us, the mechanism is not k-DIC
– a contradiction.
Case 2: Suppose s > s ′. Since xi > s > s
′, it follows from the single-peaked property (Proposi-
tion 3.2) that u∗i (s,x,k) ≥ u
∗
i (s
′,x,k). is contradicts (6). 
We now prove our second proposition towards the characterization result. Proposition 3.8 says
that, if a mechanism is DIC for some k < n then it is DIC for k = n. us, the DIC requirement
is more restrictive for k < n than for k = n – meaning that the capacity constraints induce new
strategic concerns for the mechanism designer.
Proposition 3.8. If a mechanism M is DIC, for some k < n, then it is DIC for k = n. e converse
is not true.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that M is not DIC for k = n. at is, for some
agent i with location xi there exists a report x
′
i , a profile of other agent reports xˆ−i , and a profile
of other agent locations x−i such that
u∗i (M(x
′
i , xˆ−i ),x,n) > u
∗
i (M(xi , xˆ−i ),x,n). (7)
Let s ′ = M(x ′i , xˆ−i ) and s = M(xi , xˆ−i ). When k = n all agents are served and so (7) simplifies to
1 − d(s ′, xi ) > 1 − d(s, xi ). (8)
Now we consider the same profile of reports but for an arbitrary k < n. Furthermore, suppose
all agents have location equal to xi and agent i has highest priority (⊲), i.e., aer tie-breaking. e
mechanism output is independent of agent true locations and so we still aainM(x ′i , xˆ−i ) = s
′ and
M(x ′i , xˆ−i ) = s . Furthermore, since i has highest priority (recall that the priority is distance-based
but in this instance all agents are equidistant for every facility location) they are always served
for every facility location. In particular, the utility from reporting truthfully is 1 − d(s, xi ) and
misreporting is 1−d(s ′, xi ) – the laer provides strictly higher utility, as per (8). We conclude that
the mechanism is not DIC, and since k < n was chosen arbitrarily it holds for all k < n.
e final statement in the proposition was shown in Example 3.3. 
We now prove our third and final proposition, which completes the characterization result.
Proposition 3.9 says that, if a mechanism is DIC for some k < n then it is a GMM.
Proposition 3.9. If a mechanism M is DIC, for some k < n, then it is a GMM.
Proof. LetM be a mechanism that is DIC for some k < n.
First, consider an instance where an arbitrary agent i has location xi , and the other agents report
xˆ−i . If i reports truthfully the mechanism outputs some location that we denote as s , i.e.,
s := M(xi , xˆ−i ). (9)
If s = xi then consider an alternate location and profile of other agents’ reports so that the equality
does not hold. If no such location and report profile exists then the mechanism always coincides
Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, and David C. Parkes 11
with agent i’s report; that is, the mechanism is the agent i dictatorship mechanism, which is a
GMM.
Now suppose s , xi , and without loss of generality assume s < xi . By assumptionM is DIC, for
some k < n, and so it must be that for all x ′i
u∗i (s,x,k) ≥ u
∗
i (M(x
′
i , xˆ−i ),x,k), (10)
where x denotes the location profile of all agents.
We now show that deviations by agent i satisfy the uncompromising property, i.e., for any x ′i ≥ s
M(x ′i , xˆ−i ) = s . To do so, we analyze different cases and sequential refine the possible values of
M(x ′i , xˆ−i ), we the derive a contradiction to eventually conclude thatM(x
′
i , xˆ−i ) = s .
Case 1: Suppose all other agents have location s . When agent i truthfully reports xi the facility
location is s and they aain zero utility. Now consider some report x ′i ≥ s , leading to facility
location
sx ′
i
:= M(x ′i , xˆ−i ).
If sx ′
i
∈ ( s+xi2 , 1] for any x
′
i ≥ s we aain a contradiction, since this agent i would be served from
this report and aain strictly more utility than being truthful. We conclude that
sx ′
i
∈ [0, s) ∪ {s} ∪ (s,
s + xi
2
) for all x ′i ≥ s .
Case 2: Suppose all other agents have location 1, noting that s < xi ≤ 1. In the event that
xi = 1 (in which case all agents are equidistant from every facility location), assume agent i has
the highest priority in the tie-breaking rule (⊲). When agent i truthfully reports their location they
are served and aain utility 1 − d(s, xi ). To avoid a contradiction of (10), it must be that sx ′
i
≤ s .
us, we conclude
sx ′
i
∈ [0, s) ∪ {s} for all x ′i ≥ s .
For the sake of a contradiction suppose there exists some x ′′i ≥ s such that
sx ′′
i
∈ [0, s). (11)
Consider a new instance where agent i’s location is yi = x
′′
i (note that x
′′
i ≥ s), all other agents
have location 1, and the other agents report xˆ−i (the same profile of reports as per (10)). In the
event that yi = x
′′
i = 1 (in which case all agents are equidistant from every facility location),
assume agent i has the highest priority in the tie-breaking rule (⊲). If agent i reports their location
yi the facility location is syi = sx ′′i < s , as per (11), and they aain utility 1 − d(syi ,yi ). But now
misreporting to y′i = xi then as per (9) the facility location is s where
syi < s ≤ yi ,
leading to utility 1 − d(s,yi ). is is a contradiction of the mechanism being DIC, since d(s,yi ) <
d(syi ,yi ); that is, agent i by reporting y
′
i instead of their true location yi aains strictly higher
utility. We conclude that sx ′
i
= s for all x ′i ≥ s . us, the mechanism is uncompromising and hence
a GMM. 
4 APPROXIMATION OF DIC MECHANISMS
Given the characterization result (eorem 3.5) of the previous section, there is no distinction
between the family of mechanisms that are DIC for some k < n, and the family of mechanisms
that are DIC for all k ≤ n: both families are equal to the GMM family. Accordingly, we will now
simply refer to a mechanism as being DIC.
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4.1 Optimal mechanism is not DIC
We first show that, in general for k < n, the optimal mechanism is not DIC. Note that this result
contrasts with the k = n seing where the median mechanism is both optimal and DIC (Remark 1).
Theorem 4.1. e optimal mechanism is DIC if and only if k ∈ {1,n}.
Proof. e backward direction of the theorem statement is straightforward: If k = 1 then for
any i ∈ N the agent i dictator mechanism, where the mechanism output always coincides with
agent i’s report, is both optimal and DIC. is is trivial and we do not provide further details. If
k = n then the median mechanism is both optimal and DIC. is result has long been known and
can be found in Black [1948], Moulin [1980], Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2013].
We now prove the forward direction using the contrapositive. Let k < {1,n} and partition the
agent into ⌊n/k⌋ groups of size k , denoted by Nt for t = 1, 2, . . . , ⌊n/k⌋, and one group of size
n − ⌊n/k⌋, denoted by N ⌊n/k ⌋+1. We now identify ⌊n/k⌋ + 1 locations in [0, 1], let
yt =
t
⌊n/k⌋ + 1
for t = 1, 2, . . . , ⌊n/k⌋ + 1.
Consider a scenario such that for each t = 1, 2, . . . , ⌊n/k⌋ + 1, all but one agent in Nt is located
at yt and a single agent is located at yt − t ε for some sufficiently small ε > 0. In each instance
denote the single agent located at yt − t ε by it ∈ Nt .
In this scenario it is immediate the optimal welfare is aained by locating the facility at location
y1, leading to a social welfare of k − ε and agent i1 aain utility 1 − ε .
Now in a new scenario where agent i1 is located at y1 − 3ε the optimal mechanism must locate
the facility at y2. In this case agent i1 aains utility zero. However, if agent i1 misreport their
location to y1 − ε then (as shown above) the facility location will be y1 and they will aain strictly
higher utility 1 − ε . at is, the optimal mechanism is not DIC for k < {1,n}. 
Despite eorem 4.1 stating a stark impossibility result, we note that absent strategic manip-
ulations by the agents the optimal mechanism can be efficiently computed. Remark 2 says that,
for any k ≤ n the optimal mechanism’s output and corresponding welfare can be computed in
polynomial time.
Remark 2. e optimal facility location and welfare can be computed in polynomial time for any
k ≤ n.
We sketch an informal argument for Remark 2. Order the agents i ∈ N such that xi ≤ x j if and
only if i ≤ j . It is straightforward to show that an optimal solution has two features (1) the facility
serves a contiguous set of k agents, i.e., if agent i and i + 2 are served then agent i + 1 is served,
and (2) the facility is located at the median of these k served agents. Given these features, it is
immediate that a polynomial-time procedure exists by simply comparing the welfare produced by,
the at most n, sets of k contiguous agents.
4.2 Lower bound on DIC approximation
Utilizing the characterization result of DIC mechanisms via the family of GMMs, we provide a
lower bound on the approximation ratio for all DIC mechanisms.
eorem 4.2 shows that at best a DIC mechanisms provides a 2 k
k+1 -approximation when k ≤
⌈(n − 1)/2⌉, and otherwise provides at best an max{ n−1
k+1 , 1}-approximation. is lower bound on
the approximation ratio is illustrated in Figure 1.
Theorem 4.2. Let n ≥ 2. A DIC mechanism is at best an α-approximation with α = 2 kk+1 when
1 ≤ k ≤ ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉, and α = max{ n−1
k+1 , 1} otherwise.
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Proof. Let M be a DIC mechanism, and consider a scenario where all n agents have distinct
locations contained in the interval I = (1/2 − 1/2ε, 1/2 + 1/2ε) for some sufficiently small ε > 0.
Denote the profile of agent locations by x , and the mechanism’s corresponding output by s = M(x).
We consider two cases.
Case 1: Suppose s < I and without loss of generality assume s < 1/2 − 1/2ε . Now suppose that
sequentially agents i = 1, 2, . . . ,n have their locations changed and kept at xi = 1, and consider the
sequence of facility locations produced by the mechanism s1, s2, . . . , sn . By the uncompromising
property (satisfied byM since it is a GMM) the location of the facility never changes from s . at
is, sn = s despite every agent having location at 1. e optimal social welfare in this scenario is
clearly k , however, the mechanism provides welfare of
k(1 − d(s, 1)) = k s < k(1/2 − 1/2ε) → k/2 as ε → 0.
us, the approximation ratio is at best k/(k/2) = 2.
Case 2: Suppose s ∈ I and without loss of generality assume s ≤ 1/2. Let λ1, λ2 be the number
of agents with locations strictly less than s , and strictly above s , respectively. Note that λ1 + λ2 ∈
{n − 1,n}. Similar to Case 1, suppose the λ1 agents instead had location at 0 and the λ2 agents had
location at 1 – by the uncompromising property the facility location is unchanged.
To aain the bound on the approximation ratio we consider two subcases where k ≤ ⌈(n−1)/2⌉
and k > ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉.
In the first subcase (k ≤ ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉): the optimal welfare is k , since either λ1 or λ2 exceeds k
meaning that k agents can be served at either 0 or 1. e mechanism’s welfare is at most
1 + (k − 1)(1 − d(s, 0)) < 1 + (k − 1)(1/2 − 1/2ε) → 1/2 + k/2 as ε → 0.
us, the approximation ratio is at best k/(1/2 + k/2) = 2k/(k + 1).
In the second subcase (k > ⌈(n−1)/2⌉): the optimal welfare is at worst ⌈(n−1)/2⌉, i.e., when the
facility serves either λ1 or λ2 agents (whichever is larger) from location 0 or 1. e mechanism’s
welfare is at most
1 + (k − 1)(1 − d(0, s)) < k − (k − 1)(1/2 − 1/2ε) → k/2 + 1/2 as ε → 0.
us, the approximation ratio is at best ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉/(k/2 + 1/2), but
⌈(n − 1)/2⌉/(k/2 + 1/2) ≥
(n − 1)/2
(k + 1)/2
=
n − 1
k + 1
.
Furthermore since k > (n − 1)/2 it follows that n−1
k+1 < 2. Of course, this bound is only meaningful
when n − 1/k + 1 > 1.
We conclude that when k ≤ ⌈(n − 1)/2⌉ the approximation ratio is at best 2 k
k+1 and otherwise
is at best max{ n−1k+1 , 1}. 
4.3 Optimized approximation ratio for DIC Mechanism
We now analyze the performance of the median mechanism for general k ≤ n. In instances where
k ∈ {1,n}, themedianmechanism is both optimalmechanism andDIC (eorem4.1). Furthermore,
this mechanism is DIC for all k ≤ n since the median mechanism is a GMM (eorem 3.5).
eorem 4.3 says that the median mechanism is an α-approximation where α = 2 k
k+1 when
k ≤ ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋, and α = min{2 kk+1 , 1 + 2
n−k+1
3k−2n−2 } otherwise. In particular, this means that the
median mechanism is optimal among DICmechanism for k ≤ ⌊(n−1)/2⌋ since the approximation-
ratio matches the lower bound found in eorem 4.2. ese approximation results are illustrated
in Figure 1.
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Theorem 4.3. Let n ≥ 5. e median mechanism is an α-approximation with α = 2 k
k+1 for
k ≤ ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋, and α = min{2 k
k+1 , 1 + 2
n−k+1
3k−2n−2 } otherwise.
Proof. Let n ≥ 5. roughout the proof let im denote the agent with median location (choose
the agent arbitrarily if multiple such agents exist), and let sm denote the median location. e
median mechanism provides welfare
ΠM (x,k) = max
N ′∈Nk
∑
i ∈Nk
(1 − d(sm, xi )) = 1 + max
N ′∈Nk−1, im
∑
i ∈Nk−1, im
(1 − d(sm, xi )),
where Nk is the set of all k-sized subsets of N and Nk−1,im is the set of all (k − 1)-sized subsets
of N \{im}. is follows since the subset of agents served are always the k-closest to the facility
location. Hence, given a facility location, the served subset is welfare maximizing. Furthermore,
the median location coincides with at least one agent’s location, i.e., agent im .
First, we provide an upper bound on the approximation-ratio for all k . e median mechanism
locates the facility at the ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋-th location and hence there are ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ − 1 agents with
locations (weakly) below and ⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ − 1 with locations (strictly) above. A lower bound on the
median mechanism’s welfare is aained when the agents below and above the median location at
located at 0 and 1, respectively. us,
ΠM (x,k) ≥ 1 + (k − 1)max{1 − d(sm, 0), 1 − d(sm, 1)},
and since either d(sm, 0) ≤ 1/2 or d(sm, 1) ≤ 1/2 it follows that ΠM (x,k) ≥ (k + 1)/2. is leads
to an upper bound on the approximation-ratio of k/((k + 1)/2) = 2 k
k+1 for all k , since the optimal
welfare is always bounded above by k .
Now we aain a tighter upper bound for certain values of k . To do so, we bound the median
welfare using the optimal welfare. Let s∗ be the location of the facility under the optimal mecha-
nism. Let N ∗m denote the set of k agents served under the median mechanism, and let N
∗ denote
the set of k agents served under the optimal mechanism. We have
ΠM (x,k) ≥
∑
i ∈N ∗
(
1 − d(sm, xi )
)
=
∑
i ∈N ∗
(
1 − d(sm, xi ) − d(s
∗
, xi ) + d(s
∗
, xi )
)
= Π
∗(x,k) −
∑
i ∈N ∗
(
d(sm, xi ) − d(s
∗
, xi )
)
.
Clearly, the lower bound is smallest when sm , s
∗, without loss of generality assume that sm < s
∗.
LetN ∗1 ,N
∗
2 be a partition ofN
∗ such that |N ∗1 |, |N
∗
2 | ≤ ⌊(n+1)/2⌋ and all agents in N
∗
1 have location
in [0, sm] and agent inN
∗
2 have location in [sm, 1]. Such a partition ofN
∗ exists since the location sm
coincides with the ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ highest location. Using this partition we further bound the median
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mechanism’s welfare:
ΠM (x,k) ≥ Π
∗(x,k) −
∑
i ∈N ∗1
(d(sm, xi ) − d(s
∗
, xi )) −
∑
i ∈N ∗2
(d(sm, xi ) − d(s
∗
, xi ))
≥ Π∗(x,k) − |N ∗1 | max
x ∈[0,sm ]
(
sm − s
∗ − 2x
)
− |N ∗2 | max
x ∈[sm,1]
(
xi − sm − |s
∗ − xi |
)
≥ Π∗(x,k) − |N ∗1 |(sm − s
∗) − |N ∗2 |(s
∗ − sm)
≥ Π∗(x,k) − (|N ∗2 | − |N
∗
1 |)(s
∗ − sm)
≥ Π∗(x,k) − (|N ∗2 | − |N
∗
1 |).
We now aain our lower bound by considering the maximum value of |N ∗2 | − |N
∗
1 |. For k ≤
⌊(n + 1)/2⌋, the value can only be guaranteed to be no larger than k – leading to a trivial zero
lower on ΠM (x,k). However, for k > ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ we aain a more useful bound by noting that
(|N ∗2 | − |N
∗
1 |) ≤ ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ − (k − ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋) = 2⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ − k ≤ n + 1 − k .
is lead to an approximation-ratio upper bound of
max
x ∈
∏
n
i=1 X
{
Π
∗(x,k)
Π∗(x,k) − n − 1 + k
}
= max
x ∈
∏
n
i=1 X
{
1 +
n + 1 − k
Π∗(x,k) − n − 1 + k
}
.
Furthermore, for any instance Π∗(x,k) ≥ k/2 since at least as much welfare is aained by locating
the facility at s = 1/2. us, an upper bound on the approximation ratio is
1 +
n + 1 − k
k/2 − n − 1 + k
= 1 + 2
n + 1 − k
3k − 2n − 2
.

5 EXTENSION: LOCATION-ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
In this section we consider an extension of our frameworkwhere themechanism designer is able to
dictate which agents are served by the facility. Note that this extension introduces an underlying
assumption that the facility is excludable. In practice, a designer may be able to dictate which
agents are served by issuing permits or, when costs are not prohibitive, checking the identities of
agents aempting to benefit from the facility.
Previously, a mechanism M :
∏
i ∈N X → X was defined as a function mapping a profile of
locations to a single facility location. In our extension, a mechanism not only locates the facility
but also chooses a subset of at most k agents to be served by the facility, if they so choose. We
denote these extended mechanisms by
MA :
∏
i ∈N
X → X × Nk ,
where Nk = {A ⊆ N : 0 < |A| ≤ k}. We call these mechanisms location-allocation mechanisms, to
distinguish them from the (location-only)mechanisms considered in earlier sections of the present
paper. e output of the mechanism is a pair (s,A) ∈ X × Nk where s ∈ X denotes the facility
location andA ∈ Nk denotes the subset of agents allocated to the facility. Abusing notation slightly
we will denote the mechanism output from a location profile x by sx and Ax where MA(x) =(
sx , Ax
)
. An agent i ∈ A is guaranteed to be served by the facility if they so choose, whilst an
agent i < A is never served.
We omit the details, but it is immediate that the modified subgame Γx (s,k,A) has an essentially
unique ex-post Nash equilibriumwhere all agents i ∈ A are served by the facility and the remaining
agents are not. us, we assume that agent i reports their location to the mechanism designer with
Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, and David C. Parkes 16
the understanding that they will be served by the facility if and only if i ∈ A, as per the ex-post
Nash equilibrium. Note that the strategyproof concept, DIC, in this section still coincides with the
concept used in the earlier sections, albeit with the modified subgame explained above.
We first remark that the revelation principle [Gibbard, 1973] does not apply. A location-only
mechanism, based on the profile of agent reports, xˆ , outputs a facility location s – that depends on xˆ
– and a subset of k agents are then allocated to the facility, via the ex-post Nash equilibrium,A ⊆ N
– this subset depends on the agent true locations x and not the reports xˆ . In contrast, a location-
allocationmechanism outputs both a facility location and an allocation of ≤ k agents to the facility
depending on agent reports xˆ , and not true locations x . us, an agent misreporting their location
– in a way that does not affect the facility location – will never affect whether or not they are
served by the facility under a location-only mechanisms. However, under a location-allocation
mechanism the agent may potentially benefit from the misreport if they are now allocated to the
facility by the mechanism.
We now show that no ‘reasonable’ location-allocation-mechanism is DIC. In particular, we only
enforce one criteria, which is a weak form of anonymity. Informally speaking, we require that the
location-allocation mechanism allocates agents to the facility independently of their label if their
report is distinct from all other agents. e usual definition of anonymity is not directly applicable
since with a deterministic mechanism, if all agents report identical locations the mechanism must
discriminate against at least n − k agents who will not be included in the allocation set A.
To formally define our anonymity condition we first introduce the notion of an i-identifiable
location profile. is is simply a profile where agent i is uniquely identified by their report.
Definition 5.1 (i-identifiable location profile). Let i ∈ N . A location profile x is i-identifiable if
xi , x j for all j ∈ N \{i}.
We now define our anonymity condition, which we call allocation-anonymous since the condi-
tion only applies to the allocation set rather than the facility location. Informally speaking, the
allocation-anonymous condition requires that for every i-identifiable location profile, whether or
not agent i is allocated to the facility does not depend on i’s label. Given that allocation-anonymity
only applies to i-identifiable location profiles the condition is relatively weak.
Definition 5.2 (Allocation-anonymous). emechanismMA is said to be allocation-anonymous if
for every distinct i, j ∈ N and every i-identifiable location profile x , the modified profile x ′ such
that xℓ = x
′
ℓ
for all ℓ , i, j and
x ′i = x j and x
′
j = xi ,
we have
i ∈ Ax ⇐⇒ j ∈ Ax ′,
where Ax is such thatMA(x) =
(
sx , Ax
)
.
We now show that if we restrict our aention to allocation-anonymous mechanisms there is no
DIC location-allocation mechanism.
Theorem 5.3. Let k < n, any location-allocation mechanism MA that is allocation-anonymous is
not DIC.
Proof. For the sake of a contradiction suppose thatMA is a location-allocationmechanism that
is both allocation-anonymous and DIC.
First consider a location profile x where xi = 3/4 for all i ∈ N , and denote the output of the
mechanism by MA(x) = (s,A). Let i
∗ be some agent such that i∗ ∈ A and j∗ some agent such that
j∗ < A. In this outcome agent j∗ aains utility zero, since j∗ < A.
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Now consider another location profile x ′ such that x ′i = 3/4 for all i ∈ N \{j
∗} and x ′j∗ = 1/2.
Note that the profile x ′ can be achieved via a unilateral deviation from the profile x by agent j∗.
Denote the mechanism’s output from this location profile by MA(x
′) = (s ′,A′). We consider two
cases and derive a contradiction in each case.
Case 1: Suppose j∗ ∈ A′ and suppose that x is the true location of all agents. In this case
agent j∗ by misreporting their location to x ′j∗ = 1/2 strictly profits, since under the profile x
′ we
have j∗ ∈ A′ and their utility is now 1−d(s ′, 34 ) > 0 rather than zero. us, we have a contradiction.
Case 2: Suppose j∗ < A′ and suppose that the agents have true locations yℓ = 3/4 for all
ℓ ∈ N \{i∗} and yi∗ = 1/2. Denote the mechanism’s output from location profile y by MA(x
′) =
(s ′′,A′′). Notice that x ′ is a j∗-identifiable location profile and the profile y satisfies the condition
in Definition 5.2, and so by the allocation-anonymous property we require that
i∗ ∈ A′′ ⇐⇒ j∗ ∈ A′.
us, we infer that i∗ < A′′ and aain zero utility under the location profile y. Now suppose
agent i∗ unilaterally deviates and reports the location y′i∗ = 3/4. In this case, the location profile
coincides with the profile x where xℓ = 3/4 for all ℓ ∈ N . But recall that MA(x) = (s,A) and i
∗
was taken to be some agent such that i∗ ∈ A. us, under this unilaterally misreport agent i∗ is
now served and aain strictly positive utility of 1 − d(s,yi∗) > 0. is is a profitable deviation
and contradicts our assumption that the mechanism MA was DIC. We conclude that there is no
location-allocation mechanism that is both allocation-anonymous and DIC. 
e above impossibility result means that the extensive-form approach taken in the main body
of this paper is crucial for DIC mechanisms that are non-dictatorial. e use of an extensive-form
game and corresponding ex-post Nash equilibria to decide the allocation of agents to the facility
reduces the incentive compatibility constraints faced by the mechanism designer. Furthermore,
the result suggests that the excludability of the facility presents a greater challenge for incentive
compatibility than rivalry.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We now conclude the paper with a brief discussion of future research directions.
Extensions to multiple facilities: In the present paper we focused on the case of a single capac-
ity constrained facility location problem. Extending the capacity constrained to multiple facili-
ties presents a number of challenges. Firstly, the subgame induced from a profile of facility lo-
cation will lead to multiple equilibria that are not welfare (nor utility) equivalent. Furthermore,
even when ignoring the multiplicity of equilibria issues, the mechanism design problem is dras-
tically more complicated – as is the algorithmic problem of finding the optimal facility locations
(see Brimberg et al. [Brimberg et al., 2001]). A recent contribution by Golowich, Narasimhan and
Parkes [Golowich et al., 2018] explores the mechanism design problem for multiple facilities with-
out capacity constraints.
Weakening DIC: A natural direction to consider is weakening the strategproofness concept
(DIC) that we use in the present paper. e DIC requirement is very strong: agents must aain
maximal ex-post utility from reporting their location nomaerwhat other agents report, and other
agents’ true locations. e weaker notion of ex-post Incentive Compatible (IC) may be interesting
to be explore for both characterization and performance results. is notion requires that agents
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aain maximal ex-post utility from reporting their location no maer the other agents’ true loca-
tions, but conditional on the other agents reporting truthfully. It is straightforward to construct
IC mechanisms that out-perform the median mechanism for certain parameter ranges.
Conclusion: In this paper we initiated the study of the capacity constrained facility location
problem from a mechanism design perspective. We formalized a model that allows the subset of
served agents to be endogenously derived from equilibrium outcomes. Our main contribution is a
complete characterization of all DIC mechanisms via the family of GMM mechanisms. is char-
acterization also provides a novel perspective to an open problem in regard to GMMmechanisms,
posed in [Border and Jordan, 1983]. Our second contribution is an analysis of the performance of
DICmechanisms with respect to social welfare – where we also show that the well-knownmedian
mechanism is optimal among DIC mechanism for certain parameter ranges. Finally, we show that
extending the space of mechanisms to allow the mechanism to allocate agents to the facility leads
to a stark impossibility result. Namely, there is no allocation-anonymous DIC mechanism which
both locates the facility and stipulates the subset of agents to be served.
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A OMITTED PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let 〈x, s,k〉 be an arbitrary instance, and consider the subgame
Γx (s,k). We first show there always exists an equilibrium where agents in N
∗
k
(x, s) are served,
and the others are not. To see this, suppose all i ∈ N ∗
k
(x, s) choose action ai = s and all other
agents choose ai = ∅. In this case, the k agents in N
∗
k
(x, s) aain utility 1 − d(s, xi ) ≥ 0, and all
other agents aain utility zero. An agent in i ∈ N ∗
k
(x, s) can never strictly benefit from deviating
to ai = 0, since this leads to utility zero. An agent j not in N
∗
k
(x, s) can never strictly benefit from
deviating to aj = s , since the tie-breaking rule (⊲) would lead to the agent not being served – hence,
aaining utility −d(s, x j ) ≤ 0.
We now show that an agent’s equilibrium utility is invariant across equilibria (when multiple
equilibria exist). Let i ∈ N be some agent, let σ ,σ ′ be two distinct equilibria of the subgame
Γx (s,k). Denote agent i’s utility in each of these equilibria by u¯i , u¯
′
i , respectively. Note that u¯i , u¯
′
i ∈
{0, 1 − d(s, xi )}.
For the sake of a contradiction suppose that u¯i , u¯
′
i , notice that this necessarily implies that
d(s, xi ) < 1 and k < n. Without loss of generality assume u¯i = 0 and u¯
′
i = 1 − d(s, xi ) > 0. If σ
is an equilibrium it must be that agent i is not served when choosing action ai = s; that is, agent
i is not in the set of k-closest agents N ∗
k
(x, s). Now consider the equilibrium σ ′ where agent i is
served. Given that the facility has capacity k < n, and agent i is served despite i < N ∗
k
(x, s) there
must be an agent j ∈ N ∗
k
(x, s) such that they choose action a′j = ∅ (and are not served). In this case,
agent j aain utility zero in equilibrium σ ′. If instead agent j unilaterally deviated to the action
a′′j = s they would be served and aain utility 1 − d(s, x j ) ≥ 0. Furthermore, 1 − d(s, x j) > 0 since
agent j ∈ N ∗
k
(x, s) and i < N ∗
k
(x, s) and so d(s, x j ) ≤ d(s, xi ) < 1. We conclude that σ
′ is not an
equilibrium; that is, we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let 〈x, s,k〉 and 〈x, s ′,k〉 be two instances such that for some agent
i s < s ′ ≤ xi , or xi ≤ s
′ < s . From Proposition 3.1, in the first instance we know that agent i aains
utility 1−d(s, xi )whenever i ∈ N
∗
k
(x, s) and otherwise aains utility zero. Similarly, in the second
instance i aains utility 1 − d(s ′, xi ) whenever i ∈ N
∗
k
(x, s ′) and otherwise aains utility zero.
e set N ∗
k
(x, s) is defined as the k-closest agents with respect to ⊲ to the facility, and N ∗
k
(x, s ′)
is similarly defined with respect to the priority ⊲′. If s < s ′ ≤ xi or xi ≤ s
′ < s then agent i’s
priority under ⊲′ (weakly) improves compared to their priority under ⊲. us, i ∈ N ∗
k
(x, s) implies
i ∈ N ∗
k
(x, s ′). We conclude that agent i aains weakly higher utility in the 〈x , s ′,k〉 instance. 
